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TOWARD AN EXPERIENTIAL SPORT AESTHETIC 
by 
Carolyn E. Thomas 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional aesthetic theories and philosophies of art1 have been concerned 
with the art object and usually with the beauty of the object via some mode of 
sense perception. The artist has been considered only in relationship to his 
having produced the object. Some dancers,2 for example, suggest that dance as 
an art experience is essentially a creative process. However, often this definition 
and aesthetic which examines, or is based upon, the process sHll concerns itself 
with the object-the dance. Ultimately, it concerns itself with the elements of 
the art object-color, space, shape, flow, time, and continuity-rather than with 
the dancer's experience of dancing. In short, the aesthetic experience and its 
examination has almost always presupposed an object. Although the sport 
aesthetic necessarily presupposes an object-the body and its movement-it will 
be the contention in this paper that it does so only insofar as it allows 
facilitation of the athletes' experience. 
To follow traditional aesthetic theories in the development of a sport 
aesthetic, the focus would be in the beauty of the human body in motion and 
would consider the grace, efficiency, and effortlessness of movement achieved 
in skilled performance. Some sport movements such as those in gymnastics, 
figure skating, synchromized swimming, and diving which have dance over­
tones have often been termed beautiful and artistic. However, in other sports 
this expertise and "beauty " conjures a utilitarian, structured, and mechanistic 
process rather than the expressive reactions which have served as criteria for 
aesthetic theories. Since it is theoretically apparent that this objectification of 
the body and its movements cannot be considered artistic, the necessity arises 
to look away from the art object and toward the artists' experience and the 
nature of the aesthetic experience as a probable alternative in the development 
of a sport aesthetic. 
The aesthetic experience has been defined broadly as a feeling attributed to 
an experience in which the sensuous, qualitative aspects are encountered apart 
from all mediation by ideas, and independently of any determination as to 
whether or not anything else exists. 3 Use of this definition from the perspective 
of the artist points the way to a subjective, highly individualistic, and affective 
experiential aesthetic. Although any single definition of art is necessarily limiting 
and inflexible, the following operational definition is the synoptic result of 
definitions offered by many aesthetic theoreticians. Art is the object of the 
aesthetic experience, i.e., from the audience perspective it is the object which 
is the cause of the aesthetic experience or from the artists' perspective it is Lhe 
object which results from, or symbolizes, the aesthetic experience. This 
resultant object can be defined further as a concrete representation via some 
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media or, as this paper will attempt to show, as a reflective description of a 
feeling or emotion resulting from man's involvement with sport. The intent of 
this paper is to develop criteria in which sport, from the performer's perspective 
of the experience, may Ji:>e considered as an aesthetic experience. 
AN INITIAL CONSIDERATION OF SPORT AS AN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
Before establishing specific criteria for considering sport as an aesthetic ex­
perience, it seems appropriate after independent discussion of the aesthetic and· 
sport experience to cite some of the commonalities already expressed in the 
two previous chapters. There is no intent here to be all-inclusive in noting 
similarities nor to suggest that because of these similarities there is sufficient 
reason for regarding the sport and aesthetic experience as synonymous. For 
whatever purpose the existence of art and sport is considered to have, the fact 
remains that art is done by artists and viewed by audiences for different reasons 
than sport is done by athletes and viewed by audiences. Also, it must be noted 
that reasons for doing and viewing in both art and sport differ. However, the 
contention in this and the following chapter is that the experience of the 
performer in doing art or sport is similar and that the nature of these two ex­
periences can be considered aesthetic. 
What Huizinga defines in the following passage is the nature of play but the 
definition as Hein4 points out could just as well be of the aesthetic experience . 
. . . a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits 
of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, 
having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and the 
consciousness that it is different from "ordinary" life. 5 
Huizinga has cited a number of features common to both the play and aesthetic 
experiences: spatial-temporal characteristics, arbitrary rules, non-utilitarian qual­
ities, affectivity, and the fact that it is marked off, as Dewey has outlined, from 
everyday and ordinary experiences. 
Competition, whether direct or indirect, against self, others, or some arbitrary 
standard, is a dominant characteristic of sport. There is present an intent. and 
desire to win if winning is the nature of the specific activity, achieve what has 
not been achieved, or attain some standard of excellence whether this standard is 
internally or externally imposed. "It is a relative matter, the victory being over 
self and previous performance or over fellow competitors of comparable 
standard rather than against an arbitrary standard or a record." Similarly, the 
artist has an intent and desire to reach goals of achievement and excellence. 
Despite the absence of score, there is an internal competitiveness to do well or 
to express what was intended. Within this context of self-imposed competition, 
little distinction can be made between the artist and the athlete. The product of 
these efforts, be it a score or an art object, is similarly "measured " and 
evaluated , albeit with different tools and scales, by outside observers and 
critics. 
'Huizinga and Hein both note the voluntary nature of play and the aesthetic 
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experience. Although there are philosophic and definitional distinctions between 
sport and play, both share the common element of voluntary participation by 
the performer. Voluntary involvement means freedom from external force and 
choice by the performer to participate. However, it may be feasible that the 
performer will participate due to an internal compulsion, or drive, which may, 
in that sense, render participation an involuntary function. In the case of sport 
or art being an individual's occupation, there is, for example, evidence in the 
baseball history of Boston's Jimmy Pearsall or Detroit's Willie Horton and in 
the opera history of Italy's Maria Callas to suggest that the option to not per­
form or leave in the midst of a performance is available to the performer. The 
"scratch" and the "understudy" are integral parts of the sport worlds. 
Both the aesthetic and sport experience are characterized by the structures 
of time and place. Where sport has its courts, fields, and stadia, art has its 
stages, canvasses, and concert halls. And, although it may be argued that the 
proscenium arch is being eliminated in the staging of the dramatic production, it 
may be similarly noted that in such activities as lacrosse, skiing, and frisbee 
formal boundaries have been eliminated. Most sports are marked off in periods, 
quarters, or halves, or at least, in the case of mountain climbing and skydiving, 
by a definite beginning and ending. Parenthetically, at this point, it might be 
noted that Sartre's concept of adventure and the "perfect moment" which was 
rooted in art was marked off by definite beginnings and endings and was not 
drawn out.6 Most art media in which the aesthetic experience occurs are also 
characterized by temporal separation into acts, measures, beats, or in the cases 
of painting and sculpture, by a beginning and ending. 
Sport and aesthetic experiences share the commonality of being "outside" 
of daily experiences. In comparing artist and athlete, Weiss 7 sums up what 
Dewey s, Lechner9, Adams10, and Sartre 1 1 ,have stated about the aesthetic 
experience and what Loy 12, Metheny 1 3 ,  and Huizinga14 have said about 
the is port experience: 
The athlete's world is set over against the everyday world. Economic de­
mands and the satisfaction of appetites are for the moment put aside . . . .  
Artists and historians similarly bracket off their distinctive, dynamic spatio. 
temporal worlds. What he (artist or athlete) is and what he does is for the 
moment thereby severed from the rest of the world.1 5  
Hein's1 6  main thesis in her comparison of play and the aesthetic was not only 
·that the two are non-utilitarian and autotelic in nature but that they both have 
the quality of being detached from reality, i.e., artificial restrictions are im­
posed upon real situations by social convention or by the arbitrariness of a 
group or an individual. These restrictions can take the form of previously 
mentioned spatial and temporal dimensions or of rules which are specific to the 
form and understood by the performer prior to performance. Rejection of these 
rules or failure to comply fully can result in a variety of individual penalties, ex­
pulsion, inhibition of others' performance, or ineffective execution of a work. 
Even jazz improvisation requires that everyone play in the same key. 
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The artificiality of the sport and aesthetic experience has also been noted as 
providing grounds for self-realization and as a special way of knowing self and 
the object.1 7 With regard to the artist, Lipman reiterates a viewpoint that 
Metheny and Slusher18hold for the athlete: 
The art form (media) represents a searching, a casting about for oneself, and 
when, out of this, an organized poem or painting emerges, the sense of 
personal achievement permeates the entire situation as the immediate qual­
itative experience of self. Creation implies self-creation . . .  1 9 
This way of knowing . is seen Lo be based on the experiential process rather than 
the result or product of the experience. H is a process which is immediate, 
present rather than past or future, concrete and affective as opposed to ab­
stract and cognitive, lived rather than reflected. 
Both the artist and the athlete can be classified as Dionysian in the spon­
taneity, affectivity, and subjectivity of the experience in which they participate. 
The essence of the Dionysian kind of experience is the development of feelings 
without regard to the necessity of conceptualization or analysis of these 
feelings. This does not, however, preclude actual or attempted conceptual 
analysis prior to or following the experience. 
Both the artist and the athlete can be placed in Sartre's first dimension 
where "things" have been transcended by the performer and he enters into 
"oneness" with his endeavor. In contrast, tne audience, viewing the product and 
the cognitive, analytic thingness of the performer's experience, remains objective 
and apart from the experience-Apollian. The experiential process is as Dewey 
and Slusher in particular, have noted: a deep and holistic involvement of the 
subject and object. Says Herrigel of archery : "In the case of the archer, the hitter 
and the hit are no longer two opposing objects but are one reality."20 Again, 
in comparing artist and athlete, Weiss notes: "He does not make and is not 
interested in making something that is beautiful , or in grasping the very being of 
space, time, or energy; instead he holds himself away from everything else and 
gives himself wholly to the game (process)."21 Aestheticians and sport theorists 
agree that the ability to focus away from technique, eliminate extraneous 
elements, and become involved in a transcendental process presupposes the 
mastery of technique. Even from the standpoint of the audience, Kaelin says 
that "like the virtuosity of a musical performer . . .  sport technique is the best 
when it is noticed the least."22 
All sources seem to imply that the sport and aesthetic experiences are 
highly unique and subjective. It is further implied that despite the presence of 
others the performer is essentially alone in the experiential process. Being in 
rather than outside the experience creates a highly subjective evaluation and 
reporting. The idea that each performer brings to the experience a background, 
technique, self-concept, and perception which is different is consistently 
advanced by sport and aesthetic theoreticians. It is argued further that inherent 
in this uniqueness and individual aloneness, is the impossibility of drawing con­
clusions, generalizations, or universal truths about either the aesthetic or sport 
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experience. It is even more difficult to empathize without some kind of personal 
involvement in one or both of these experiences. 
PROPOSED CRITERIA 
Authen ticity of intent.-lfhe first prerequisite for sport to be an aesthetic 
experience is that the movements during performance match the athlete's intent 
at the outset of the movement or game, i.e., the result was not accidental, and 
that the expertise exhibited was within the capabilities of the performer and 
meets the criteria for the sport. Development of intent prior to the movement 
experience· may presuppose cognitive analysis, setting the stage for involvement 
in and reflection upon the experience. It is not suggested here that one plans to 
have a perfect moment for it may never occur in a lifetime of sport experien�es. 
However, there is a necessity at the outset for the selection of an appropriate 
frame of reference in which the sport experience may occur. The desire or 
intent to win does not negate the spontaneity nor the ability to become involved 
in the experience. Nor does the recognition of one's abilities inhibit full and 
direct participation. However, winning is an authentic intent and an authentic 
achievement only when there is a legitimate and even chance to win. The upset 
is authentic only when the underdog truly has the capabilities and when the win 
would occur again under the same circumstances. Although one may intend to 
win given that the capabilities are present, winning is not relevant. The perfect 
moment occurs in the struggle, in the effort, in the process. Tritely stated, 
fulfillment and validation of intent is in "how you play the game." 
Expertise. -A second requirement for the perfect moment is that the per­
formance �xhibit qualities of excellence and consistency as established within a 
given sport. Expertise is a prerequisite for the perfect moment but this does 
not mean absolute perfection. The surfer, for example, can constantly improve 
his technique by taking on bigger waves until he reaches the "perfect" wave or 
the impossible wave. This demands greater sophistication of technique but prior 
to this reach for perfection comes a point in the surfer's ability when he has a 
consistent command of the board. He is able to transcend thoughts of body and 
board position and is able to direct his attention away from himself and 
technique and toward the "feeling" of the experience. 
Involuemen t and relation. -The third criterion to be met demands that the 
athlete establish a totally involved and committed relationship with the various 
sport movements in the sport experience which transcend cognitive considera­
tions of technique. This transcendental experience will be deemed necessary to 
establish the aesthetic, or perfect, moment which will be the object of reflective 
description. Just as the perfect moment necessitates the unity of mind and body, 
the unity or integration of man and sport is a necessary criterion for the perfect 
moment to occur. This involvement precludes the interference of extraneous 
factors in the sport situation such as crowd noise, wind, cold, etc. Involvement 
keeps man in the "first dimension" oblivious to the gaze of others, alone, and, 
for the most part, unaware of other performers e:sccept as they are necessary to 
his performance. 
Upon reflection, the athlete can sense the unity of being completely in-
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volved in the thing he is doing. Bannister describes a running experience: "I was 
running now, and a fresh rhythm entered my body. No longer conscious of my 
movement I discovered a new unity with nature. I found a new source of power 
and beauty . . . .  "28 Beets24 comments on Bannister's reaction to running and 
the fusion of subject and object in the aesthetic experience: 
You will observe that he describes his hesitating movements under the wings 
of fundamental discovery: he experienced a new unity with nature in which 
he is not conscious any longer of parts of his body and movements thereof . . .  
he forgets his body . . . .  to find a sense of unity and a source of power and 
beauty, as he calls it.25 
Whole man acting. -The last requirement for the aesthetic experience in sport 
is that the experience involve the total man, i.e., mind and body, and that the 
body be experienced as a subject rather than as an object. 'The perfect moment 
necessitates involvement of the whole man free from any implied or imposed 
dualism. It is further noted that I am my body and I have a body. Wenkart, 
VanKaam, and VanDenBerg allude to Merleau-Poniy's idea of the possibility of 
man's body-subjectivity and his body-objectivity. 
When the body is in action, as in sports, we can look at it as a human exis­
tence open toward the world. Man's personal relation to his body can be 
explained in terms of his positional consciousness. Man can become deeply 
involved in an external situation but he always keeps a certain distance from 
it. That is why we can say that man not only is his body, but also has his 
body.26 
. . .  my body is already a meaning-giving existence, even if I am not yet con­
scious of this meaning-gjving activity. My body invests my world with meaning 
even before I think about this meaning . . . .  My body makes the world and 
the other available to me . . . .  My behaving body-which I am-is the locus 
for the appropriation of sense and meaning. 2 7 
Man in the first dimension passes over, transcends the body, and experiences 
the task subjectively through it. However, in ihe second dimension under the 
gaze of others the body becomes an object. 28 
This dis.c;ectable thing-body is a derivative of the second dimension of the 
body . . . .  Also the mountaineer himself can constitute the body in the second 
dimension. This happens, for instance, when he tends the wound in his leg. 
The wounded place is examined and touched in order to cure it or: in order 
to be able to continue on his way.29 
To maintain that human existence, or man in his experiential world, is 
dualistic in nature is to disparage the body or to treat it as an object incapable 
of experiencing the world in a subjective, personal, or affective i:nanner. 
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Reflective description.-When all these prerequisites have been established and 
met, the following premises will suggest that the totality of the aesthetic ex­
perience, i.e., perfect moment, and the athletes' emotions and feelings 
following such an experience may be verbally described. 
1. The athlete enters the sport or movement act with an intent to experien�e 
positive affect. This is neither the sole nor primary reason for participation and 
may include the desire(s) to win, to perform satisfactorily or to achieve some­
thing not previously achieved. 
2. The sport experience potentially may alter or intensify the initial 
affective intent. 
3. The sport experience, or movement act, which results in an authentic 
perfect moment, creates a feeling about and/or an emotional reaction toward 
the experience. 
4. Upon reflection, the athlete becomes audience to his own act and can 
attempt to verbally describe his subjective and affective experience. 
5. The affective reflection, or aftermath of the perfect moment, becomes 
the representation of the experienced perfect moment. The description of these 
emotions or feelings are a valid representation of the perfect moment only when 
it matches the athletes' initial or experiencially altered intent and reflects the 
authentic, totally involved, and expertly performed experience. 
THE PERFECT MOMENT 
The perfect moment is. a somewhat eclectic concept belonging to the study 
of sport but which finds its basis in the similarities of some cstaiblished idea. The 
term "perfect moment" originates in Sartre's novel, Nausea, in which Sartre uses 
the two terms synonymously and they can be very nearly equated with Maslow's 
concept of peak-experience in terms of intensity and affective involvement. 
Although both Roquentin and Anny mark out various kinds of adventures, 
or perfect moments, both seem to lean toward art experiences: Roquentin in the 
"song" and the novel and Anny in the drama. It is literary convention to mark 
out a beginning and an end and the perfect moment, in Sartre's sense, has th.is 
characteristic. The song begins and ends. The play not only begins and ends but 
is further structured into acts, and sport can be seen to have this same design. 
One knows when the perfect moment is over and it can be defined apart from 
the rest of routine existence. Nowhere in the novel does Sartre suggest that the-re 
is any meaning derived from these adventures. Despite their design and harmony 
which set them aside from routine existence, perfect moments are really as 
absurd as Ii fe. 'This is not unlike Metheny•s30 suggestion that sport, after the 
fashion of Sisyphus, is an absurd mode of being. Bergson has implied that 
melody is an interpretation and that lhe adventure is really in man and not in 
the thing he is experiencing. Although not concerned with the meaning of sport, 
there does exist the possibility that the meaning of sport, like the sadness of the 
song, is really in man. 
Abraham Maslow's concept of the peak·experience "lays great stress on 
starting from experiential knowledge rather than from systems of concepts or 
abstract categories or a prioris. "31 It uses as a foundation personal, subjective 
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experience upon whi.ch abstract knowledge may be built. There is a concern 
with the· authentic, unique, and alone individual and the need to develop con­
cepts of decision, responsibility, self-creation, autonomy, and identity within 
this concern. The main concern in exploring Maslow's peak-e·xperience lies not in 
the psychological implications of the experience but with the nature of the 
experience, per se. 
Maslow does not delineate how the peak-experience is achieved and in fact 
says: 
We don't know how the peak-experience is achieved; it has not simply one-to­
one relation with any deliberated procedure; we know only that it is somehow 
earned. It is like the promise of a rainbow. It comes and it goes and it cannot 
be forgotten. 3 2  
A peak-experience is a realization that what "ought to be" is. In the Heidegger­
ian sense, it is a coming into authenticity. The peak-experience is a unique and 
almost mystic phenomenon, a coming into 'Tho or Nirvana, a state of Being rather 
than Becoming. Maslow sees the peak-experience as an end rather than as a 
means to something else. 3 3 '!'he aesthetic experience has been discussed as a 
means but this does not imply that the peak-experience and the aesthetic 
experience are antithetical. The aesthetic experience is essentially a process but 
there are . moments in the process which are significantly higher than other 
moments, a moment which is perfect, which is a peak. Similarly, the peak· 
experience is a process. However, the peak-experience and the aesthetically 
perfect moment are ends in themselves in that they are not used to accomplish 
other ends. 
Although occurring in a spatial-temporal setting, the peak-experience is 
characterized by a disorientation in time and space. "In creative furor, the poet 
or artist becomes oblivious of his surroundings and of the passage of time. ,,34 
The same can be said for the athlete. The experience is intrinsically valid, per­
fect, and complete. It is sufficient to itself and needs nothing else. It is felt as 
being intrinsically necessary and inevitable, as good as it should be. 35 "We 
cannot command the peak-experience. It happens to us'.'3 6 There is ,'an 
intensity and emotional reaction to the peak-experience that "has a special 
flavor of wonder, of awe, of reverence, of humility and surrender."37 In peak­
experiences that are classified as love experiences or aesthet.ic experiences, "one 
small part of the world is perceived as if it were for the moment all of the 
world."3 8 
The individual in the peak-experience can be viewed ahistorically in that he 
is free from the past and the future. 39 There is also a sense of uniqueness: "If 
people are different from each other in principle, they are more purely 
different in the peak-experience."40 The person ·in the peak-experience feels 
more inLegrated, more a total being, with a feeling that he is at the peak of his 
powers.4·1 He is more able to fuse with the world: "the creator becomes one 
with the work being created . . the appreciator becomes the music or the 
painting or the dance . . . . ,,4 2 
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Erwin Straus developed the gnostic-pathic moment concept in his essay, 
The Forms of Spatiality, 43 which deals primarily with man's perception of 
space. The gnostic moment may be defined as the object of experience, "the 
sensation," while the pathic moment may be expressed as the experience, "the 
sensing." Like Maslow, Straus used these concepts to explain psychological 
phenomena and again the explanation of these concepts is included in the light 
of the concepts, per se. Although both the gnostic and pathic moments are pre­
sent in the experience, there is a relative dominance of one over the other. 
Straus gives the following example: "In touching the pathic is dominant; in 
looking, the gnostic dominates. 'Looking at' brings every object into the domain 
of the objective and the general."44 Touch is the most primordial, direct and 
pathic of the senses because it allows more feedback and also permits more 
involvement. Man is a participant in rather than a spectator to what is 
occurring. It borders on being the subjective, Dionysian and uninhibited doer 
which as will be noted later, McLuhan calls "cool." 'l'he pathic moment is actual 
inside out lived experience. On the other hand, the gnostic moment is the 
object of reflection, dissection, and reduction in which man is the Apollian 
spectator. The pathic moment is not locatable. Unlike the piano in which you 
hear it, the string quartet surround� you to the point where you are almost in 
the sound. Similarly, the neon sign is the object of attention, specific and locat­
able, whereas twilight is the more pathic representation of light as it cannot be 
taken in at one glance. 
In I and Thou, Buber views the world as a relational event, i.e., there is 
nothing inherent in the I alone or the world alone to make them significant or 
meaningful. "All actual life is encounter. "4 5 His philosophy stresses the two­
fold nature of relations :as part ,of every activity or event in man's life. Every 
relationship, whether it is between man and man, man and nature, or man and 
object, is either I-It or I-Thou. God is met only as Thou. The kind of relationship 
which occurs depends on the attitude with which the I enters the relationship. 
The I-It relationship is typically a subject-object relationship. The I uses these 
"things" for some specific reason-to compare, to manipulate, to attain some 
goal. They are means to an end.46 Sport may be viewed in the It context when it 
is used for instrumental purposes-to vent aggression, to develop leadership, 
sportsmanship, or character, or to entertain. In the realm of It, men can see 
the characteristics of the It. This may be viewed as a detached view of self in 
which, for example, the body becomes an object. Man stands aside very much 
in the Apollian mode to analyze, calculate, and compare. 
On the other hand, Buber's second attitude of I-Thou has no bounds. The 
'lhou cannot be bound up and limited by comparing or measuring and Thou 
cannot be placed in the ordered world of· It. Inherent in the nature of the I-Thou 
relationship is the realization that the encounter cannot be explained or 
verbalized. 4 7 Both I and Thou are involved in the relation in a oneness of 
directedness, mutuality and presence. Without genuine involvement, the meeting 
does not take place. The presentness, or nowness, of the I-Thou relation is, as 
Buber says, "the actual and fulfilled present."48 In the realm of It, man lives in 
the past and the future, analyzing what has happened and what can be exper-
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ienced. With I and Thou there is no past and no future; it "exists only insofar as 
actual presentness, encounter, and relation exists."49 The encounter of the I­
'Thou is not set in a context of space and time.so The present has no time, it just 
is. 
Marshal McLuhan in his Understanding Media51 discusses the concept of 
various media being hot or cool and he engages in describing, either implicitly or 
explicitly, many social phenomena in thermal terms. Cool indicates a �ommit­
ment to and participation in situations involving many of one's faculties.52 
Using this thermal scale, hot implies abstraction and detachment from reality; 
and objective attempt to look at the world as it appears to be rather .than as it is. 
How-to-do-it becomes more important than the thing being done. A hot medium 
is one of "high definition," i.e., the state of being well-filled with data. 5 3 Hot 
media are high in definition and low in participation. 
In contrast, the cool media are high in participation, or completion, by the 
audience. According to McLuhan, humor is hot because it inclines one to 
laugh at something rather than getting one emphatically involved in some­
thing:54 McLuhan argues that the manner in which the medium is used deter­
mines its hotness or coolness. While both radio and the telephone use only the 
auditory sense, the telephone is "cool" because it is low in definition. SimHarly, 
a Fellini or Bergman movie demands much more involvement of the viewer than 
does a narrative or a comedy and, therefore, takes on a "cooler" aspect.5 5  The 
emphasis in the "cool" medium or the "cool" phenoi;nenon is on involvement, 
participation, and doing in contrast to the spectator perspective of an activity.: 
With regard to sport, the concept may be extended to suggest that from the 
audience perspective, baseball is "hot" and football is "cool." Baseball is a 
linear, one-dimensional game in which the spectator watches one player throw, 
then another hit, another move to field, etc. However, football entails a t-0tal 
action and involvement of all players simultaneously as soon as the ball is 
snapped. From the participant's viewpoint, sailing is "cooler" than boating in 
that the sailor must constantly shift. to tend the tiller and sails and must become 
involved with the physical elements of wind and water as well as the mechanical 
steering elements. The power boater, however, needs only remain in one spot 
and has very few adjustments to make either in steering or operation of the boat. 
The perfect moment, like the aesthetic experience, can be classified generally 
as Dionysian in nature. It is a highly affective and intense experience and is con­
sidered as a "happening" rather than as a planned occurrence. In this respect it 
can be likened to the peak�xperience and cannot be considered to be cog­
nitively rational. Although the movement sequence in the perfect moment may 
demand certain decisions, the spontaneity of the situation demands instant 
action rather than reflection. The reaction stems from the degree of expertise 
which allows the participant to react to and to transcend rational reflection. 
This does not preclude cognitive Apollian considerations of technique prior to 
or following the experience. There is a freedom and spontaneity in the perfect 
moment in which the participant feels free from external restrictions that may 
govern or inhibit performance, the most common factors being coaches and 
crowds. The participant feels free to act and is, as Friedenberg remarked, "loose 
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but tough." There is the sense of being on the threshold of greatness. Sartre 
called it a "real beginning" ·like the fanfare of trumpets or the first notes of a 
jazz tune.56 Dianne Holum57 commenting on her gold medal performance in 
the 1500 meter speedskating event at lhe 1972 Winter Olympics: "I knew I had 
won; I didn't know what my time was but coming down the stretch I knew. I 
felt great, just great. We trained for 2:20 and it was all there, I could feel it." 
Because of its experiential foundation and intense affecLivily, lhe perfect 
moment is characterized by a high degree of subjectivity. Both the aesthetic and 
sport experiences have be�n noted as being highly subjective in nature, but the 
perfect moment within the sport experience can be considered even more 
individualistic in that it carries a uniqueness that sets it apart from experiences 
of others in the same sport and apart from the experiences of the same individual 
in the same sport given any variation in existing conditions. In short, the perfect 
moment is not repeatable in its entirety. This is similar to Maslow's suggestion 
that people are more purely different in the peak-experience. The poet, painter, 
dancer and athlete come to their media with a perception which is unique to ' 
themselves. What they do to and with the media can be imitated and perhaps re· 
peated, but what they sense, feel, and experience is not repeatable. 
The man truly in the experience is alone with his work and the bond between 
artist or athlete and the medium can be likened to Buber's I-Thou concept, 
Sartre's first dimension, and Maslow's peak-experience. Buber talks about a 
"oneness" with the other which is synonymous \With subject-object fusion in the 
discussion of aestheticians Adams, Lechner, and Dewey. This "oneness" pre­
supposes fulfillment of the involvement criterion in which the "peaker" fuses 
with the world and becomes "one with the work being created." Buber main­
tained that without genuine invotvement the meeting does not take place, no 
bond is formed, and "oneness" is impossible, resulting in an I-It relationship. 
Parenthetically, what is here called the perfect moment is similar to Buber's 
concept of the I-Thou in its nowness, oneness, and ahistorical nature. Although 
the perfect moment borders on being mystic, it is not, whereas Buber's I-Thou 
relationship has religious and mystic overtones. Slusher59a11udes to sport as a 
religious experience and it may be feasible to sec sport, especially in its perfect 
moments and within the framework of Buber's writing, as a religious· experience. 
VanDenBerg60 in his discussions of Sartre's three dimensions of the body, 
refers to this unity or "oneness" as a transcending or passing over as landscape. 
In the pathic sense that Straus describes, the object of the experience becomes 
non-locatable in that involvement and fusion place man with the object in the 
experience to the extent that there is a unification of entities which, from the 
performer's perspective, cannot be viewed apart. Man becomes the thing he is 
doing. The perfect moment is "supercool" in its demand for high participation 
and the involvement of man's total being. It is also essentially low definition in 
the sense thal basic information , i.e., rules, strategies, and techniques, serves as 
the foundation but man creates the situation and must provide all thought and 
action to create the medium of self-expression. 
Dewey and Adams noted the immediacy of the experience and its 
ahistorical nature. Maslow's peak-experience and Buber's I-'Ihou relation are 
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both characterized by a presentness, or "nowness." Similarly, Straus notes that 
the pathic moment is an essential feature of primordial experience and that it is 
"immediately present and sensually vivid." In short, they all maintain these 
"lived" experiences are free from past and future experience. The perfect mo­
ment can be seen to have this same characteristic. This wave at this time is 
important. The player is urged to forget his mistakes and think-act as it 
comes. Coaches know that any psychological nagging induced by previous per­
formance or looking ahead to the next performance diverts concentration and 
involvement and destroys the immediacy of this performance. The perfect 
moment exists in the doing and not in what was or will be done. It is free to be 
what it is as it occurs. 
In this immediacy is an inherent sense of timelessne�. Like the pathic 
moment which is not locatable, the perfect moment cannot be cognitively 
timed or bounded by the participant. It becomes too intensely involved and 
affective to be limited; it comes and it goes "out" of space and "out" of time. 
The perfect moment is not sustained throughout an entire game but occurs 
withfo the time and space of the game or performance situation. It varies in 
duration and perhaps may be made most analogotJs to orgasm during the 
sexual experience. In fact, Maslow suggests that perceptions of time and space 
during the love experience and the aesthetic experience are similar in that "one 
small part of the world is perceived as if it were for the moment all of the 
world."61 
The perfect moment is complete. It has a harmony, a relationship of parts 
that gives it Sartre1s feeling of melody. There is nothing left to be done and there 
is a sense of wholeness and correctness in its occurrence. This parallels the sense 
of unity and "altogetherness" of the aesthetic and peak-experiences. It can be 
seen and felt in the rhythm of technique, the execution and timing of teamwork, 
and as the perfect integration of desire, intent, and technique. The perfect mo­
ment is the ultimate effort, a "cool" proc,ess of high participation and low 
definition. It is a process which is an end in itself and which serves no 
instrumental function . It may be a struggle, a conquest, or an achievement or it 
may be effortless or a second place. In any case, it is the best man can do with 
and in the sport experience. The perfect moment is a peak, pathic in perception, 
cool to the point of being cold in the McLuhan sense, and the relational bond 
of the I-Thou. (It is a happening in the first dimension and, above all, the 
perfect moment which the aesthetic experience in and of sport is.) 
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